DEFINITIONS
Basket A chemically non-reactive cruciform or egg-crate-like structure inside a storage canister or cask or transportation canister or cask that establishes the physical boundaries of positions for and provides structural support and protection for used nuclear fuel assemblies, provides neutron poison media between fuel assembly locations, provides neutron flux traps between fuel assembly locations, and provides mechanisms and channels for transferring heat away from fuel assemblies.
Burnup A measure of the total thermal power produced by a specified quantity and type of nuclear fuel material irradiated in a nuclear reactor, e.g., megawatt-days per metric ton of initial uranium fuel.
Canister A container, along with an internal basket, used as a component of a system for the storage or transportation of used nuclear fuel.
Container
As used herein, a canister.
High Burnup Burnup exceeding 45,000 megawatt-days per metric ton of initial uranium nuclear fuel.
Hypothetical Accident Conditions
Test conditions for hypothetical transportation accidents used to evaluate the ability of transportation casks to satisfy performance requirements for certification specified in 10 CFR 71.
Low Burnup
Burnup less than 45,000 megawatt-days per metric ton of initial uranium nuclear fuel.
Neutron Poison
A material that has a high neutron absorption crosssection and that is used in a storage or transportation cask/canister basket to reduce the number of neutrons available in order to prevent a sustained nuclear chain reaction.
Normal Conditions of Transport Test conditions for incident-free, normal transportation used to evaluate the ability of transportation casks to satisfy performance requirements for certification specified in 10 CFR 71.
Retrieval
Removal of UNF from a storage or transportation canister or cask.
Shipping Container
As used herein, a shipping cask, or a transportation package used for the safe transportation of used nuclear fuel.
Stressor Any environmental factor that has the potential to cause degradation, modification, or failure of one or more important to safety functions of a storage or transportation canister or cask. 2011 Very High Burnup Synonymous with high burnup. The potential degradation mechanisms identified include those developed as part of the UFD Storage Task and include potential degradation mechanisms that may be unique to transportation or present a challenge for demonstrating and verifying the safety and compliance with regulatory requirements of post-extended storage transportation. This report is focused on UO 2 -based light water reactor UNF.
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INTRODUCTION

Approach
The UFD Transportation Task commenced in October 2010. As its first task, Pacific Northwest National Section 2 also identifies whether the particular stressor and degradation would be affected by extended storage or higher burnup UNF (> 45,000 MWd/MTU). As with the UFD Storage Task, whether additional data were needed to characterize the phenomenon, the importance of new research and development, to improve understanding or reduce uncertainties, and the importance to the ability to demonstrate and verify safe transportation in compliance with regulations were determined.
Transportation Importance was determined based on the projected ability of a stressor/degradation mechanism to cause an SSC to fail to satisfactorily perform any of its important to safety (ITS) functions during normal conditions of transportation (NCT), during hypothetical transportation accident conditions (HAC), or during retrieval. In the context of transportation, these functions are containment, prevention of nuclear criticality, shielding, heat transfer, structural integrity, and operations support (McConnell et al. 1996 ). This approach is consistent with the methodology used in the UFD Storage Task. In addition, Transportation Importance was determined based on transportation occurring after extended storage when long term degradation mechanisms such as delayed hydride cracking of zirconium-alloy fuel cladding
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would have a greater opportunity to impact the structural and confinement performance of the nuclear fuel assembly structure and thereby have the potential to affect the ability to (or approach to) demonstrate safety and regulatory compliance for transportation. It is important to note that the normal conditions of transportation, hypothetical transportation accident conditions, and retrieval were not viewed as stressors, but rather as test conditions to which a transportation package (shipping container and its UNF contents) must be subjected to determine its ability to satisfy regulatory performance requirements for safe transportation before UNF would be shipped.
FEATURES, EVENTS, AND PROCESSES
Shipping containers include the necessary structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to perform the following functions (McConnell et al. 1996 ):
• Containment: The components and supporting materials that are incorporated into the container design for the purpose of retaining the radioactive material during normal and accident conditions.
• Criticality control: The components and supporting materials that are incorporated into the container design for the purpose of maintaining the contents in a subcritical configuration during normal and accident conditions.
• Shielding: The components and supporting materials that are incorporated into the container design for the purpose of reducing radiation emitted by the contents during normal and accident conditions.
• Heat transfer: The components and supporting materials that are incorporated into the container design for the purpose of decay heat removal under normal conditions and protecting temperature-sensitive components (e.g., lead shielding and seals) under accident conditions. These components also provide significant integrity protection of these contents.
• Structural integrity: The components and supporting materials that are incorporated into the container design for the purpose of maintaining the structure in a safe condition during normal and accident conditions.
• Operations support: The components and supporting materials that are incorporated into the container design for the purpose of routine use (e.g., loading, unloading, use maintenance, monitoring, and transporting).
Typical shipping containers for UNF include the following SSCs:
• Fuel • Cladding
• Assembly Hardware
• Fuel Baskets
• Neutron Poisons
• Neutron Shielding
• Containers (Bolted Direct-Load Metal Casks and Welded Metal Canisters)
• Inert Fill Gas Additional SSCs include:
• Gamma Shielding
• Handling, Loading, and Operational Testing Features
• Impact Limiters and Impact Limiter Hardware This report focuses on determining the features, events, and processes (FEPs) that could lead to failure of these SSCs during extended storage or during subsequent transportation. In this report, failure is defined as the inability to comply with the performance requirements for test conditions specified for the NCT and the HAC in 10 CFR 71.71 and 10 CFR 71.73, respectively. For NCT, these test conditions include:
• Operating temperatures ranging from -40 °C (-40 °F) to 38°C (100 °F);
• External pressures ranging from 25 to 140 kPa (3.5 to 20 psi);
• Normal vibration experienced during transportation;
• Simulated rainfall of 5 cm/hr (2 in/hr) for 1 hour;
• Free fall from 0.3 to 1.2 meters (1 to 4 feet), depending on the package weight; and
• Impact of a 6-kilogram (13-pound) steel cylinder with rounded ends dropped from 1 meter (40 in)
onto the most vulnerable (regarding performance of any ITS feature) surface.
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For HAC, these test conditions include:
• Free-drop test: drop package 9 m (30 ft) onto an essentially unyielding horizontal surface with the package orientation arranged so that its weakest (regarding performance of any ITS feature) point is struck,
• Puncture test: drop package 1 m (40 inches) onto a vertical, 15 cm (6 in) diameter, cylindrical mild steel bar striking the package at its most vulnerable spot,
• Thermal test: exposure of packaged, fully engulfed in a fire having a temperature of at least 800ºC (1475ºF) for a period of 30 minutes with less than the specified loss of containment effectiveness, and
• Immersion test: package placed under a head of water of at least 15 m (50 ft) or an external pressure of 150 kPa (21.7 psi).
Sections 2.1 through 2.8 discuss each SSC in more detail, including potential degradation mechanisms, whether degradation is affected by extended storage or higher burnup, whether additional data is needed to address unknowns or uncertainties regarding the degradation mechanism, and the importance of conducting research and development to improve knowledge of or reduce uncertainties regarding the degradation mechanism.
Fuel
Irradiated uranium oxide fuel could degrade through 4 primary mechanisms during extended storage: 1) fuel fragmentation, 2) restructuring/swelling, 3) fission product attack on cladding, and 4) fuel oxidation (see Table 1 ). These phenomena were discussed in Section 5.1 of Hanson et al. (2011) and NWTRB (2010), Section 4.4.1. For dry storage, these degradation mechanisms were assigned a low priority for additional research and development.
Degradation of fuel during extended storage could affect the six transportation safety functions as follows:
Containment: Degradation of the fuel could have an impact on containment only if a cladding breach had occurred and the fuel was considered damaged, which is defined as UNF with other than hairline cracks or pinhole leaks (NRC 2007) . This damaged fuel could release fission gases and thereby increase the UFD Storage and Transportation -Transportation Working Group Report 6 August 31, 2011 pressure in containment. Also, fission products would be more mobile affecting the performance assessment of containment seals for bolted containments.
Criticality Control: Degradation of the fuel would have an impact on criticality control only if the fuel did not maintain its original configuration, which would require a significant cladding breach to occur.
Shielding: Degradation of the fuel would have an impact on the radiation dose rate external to shielding only if a significant cladding breach along with a substantial failure of the integrity of the cladding and fuel assembly structure had also occurred and the fuel did not maintain its original configuration.
However, substantial radioactive decay would occur during extended storage, progressively reducing the radiation dose rate from the fuel. This would reduce the importance of the radiological protection provided by shielding present in the shipping container. However, the reduced radiation dose rate may increase safeguards and security concerns.
Heat Transfer: There is no expected degradation process during extended storage that would alter the decay heat removal properties of the fuel. However, if relocation of fuel occurred because of failure of the cladding and fuel assembly structure, the distribution of the fuel heat source within the shipping container would change, which would change the heat transfer conditions and could impact on structures because of thermal stresses, etc. This would seem not to be a problem for low heat fuel, which would be the case for extended storage. However, it could present a problem for high-burnup shorter cooled UNF. Because the certificate of compliance for a shipping container specifies the maximum burnup, minimum cooling times, and maximum heat loads, as long as these criteria are met, degradation of the fuel would have no impact.
Structural Integrity: Degradation of the fuel is expected to have no impact on the structural integrity of the shipping container. However if relocation of fuel occurred because of failure of the cladding and fuel assembly structure, the distribution of the fuel heat source within the shipping container would change, which would change the heat transfer conditions and could impact on structures because of thermal stresses, etc. This would seem not to be a problem for low heat fuel, which would be the case for extended storage. However, it could present a problem for high-burnup shorter cooled UNF.
Operations Support: Degradation of the fuel in absence of degradation of the cladding would have no impact on the operations support safety function of the shipping container.
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Based on the impacts of the degradation mechanisms associated with fuel on the transportation safety functions, the degradation mechanisms associated with fuel were assigned a LOW transportation importance. 
Cladding
Cladding could degrade through 9 primary mechanisms during extended storage: 1) annealing of radiation damage, 2) metal fatigue caused by temperature fluctuations, 3) phase changes, 4) emissivity changes, 5) embrittlement and reorientation, 6) delayed hydride cracking, 7) oxidation, 8) wet corrosion, and 9) creep (see Table 2 ). These phenomena were discussed in Section 5.2 of Hanson et al. (2011) and NWTRB (2010), Section 4.4.2. For dry storage, embrittlement and reorientation was assigned a high priority for additional research and development; annealing of radiation damage, delayed hydride cracking, oxidation, and creep were assigned a medium priority, and the other degradation mechanisms were assigned a low priority.
Degradation of cladding during extended storage could affect the six transportation safety functions as follows:
Containment: If the cladding had degraded such that the configuration of the UNF assembly and its fuel component could not be assured under NTC and HAC, then the containment function of the shipping container could be affected.
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Criticality Control: If the cladding had degraded such that the configuration of the UNF assembly and its fuel component could not be assured under NTC and HAC, then the ability of the fuel to be maintained in a subcritical configuration could be affected.
Shielding: If the cladding had degraded such that the configuration of the UNF assembly and its fuel component could not be assured under NTC and HAC, then the radiation shielding function of the shipping container could be affected.
Heat Transfer: If the cladding had degraded such that the configuration of the UNF assembly and its fuel component could not be assured under NTC and HAC, then the fuel may not maintain its original configuration and the heat transfer function of the shipping container could be affected.
Structural Integrity: Degradation of the cladding would have no impact on the structural integrity of the shipping container. However, if relocation of fuel occurred because of failure of cladding and fuel assembly structure, the distribution of the fuel heat source within the shipping container would change, which would change the heat transfer conditions and could impact on structures because of thermal stresses, etc. This would seem not to be a problem for low heat fuel, which would be the case for extended storage. However, it could present a problem for high-burnup shorter cooled UNF.
Operations Support: Degradation of the cladding could allow relocation of the fuel to occur which could impact the operations support safety function of the shipping container, especially during loading and unloading.
Based on the impacts of the degradation mechanisms associated with cladding on the transportation safety functions, annealing of radiation damage and embrittlement and reorientation of hydride species were assigned a HIGH transportation importance; delayed hydride cracking, oxidation, and creep were assigned a MEDIUM transportation importance, and the other degradation mechanisms were assigned a LOW transportation importance.
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Assembly Hardware
Assembly hardware could degrade through 4 primary mechanisms during extended storage: 1) creep, 2) metal fatigue caused by temperature fluctuations, 3) corrosion and stress corrosion cracking, and 4) hydriding effects (see Table 3 ). These phenomena were discussed in Section 5.3 of Hanson et al. (2011) .
For dry storage, corrosion and stress corrosion cracking was assigned a medium priority for additional research and development. Creep, metal fatigue caused by temperature fluctuations, and hydriding effects were assigned a low priority.
Degradation of assembly hardware during extended storage could affect the six transportation safety functions as follows:
Containment: No impact.
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Criticality Control: Degradation of assembly hardware could result in loss of control of defined fuel rod pitch and could lead to changes in mechanical stress on cladding. Loss of defined fuel rod pitch could impact criticality control. Changes in mechanical stresses on cladding could result in loss of confinement of fuel and thus subsequently have the potential to impact criticality control.
Shielding: No impact except for potential changes in stresses in cladding and consequent potential loss of fuel configuration control (see Section 2.2).
Heat Transfer: Degradation of assembly hardware could alter fuel pitch which could impact the heat transfer function. Also other possible effects (see Section 2.2).
Structural Integrity: Degradation of assembly hardware would not impact the structural integrity of the shipping container except for possible changes in thermal stresses caused if there were significant changes in the physical location of fuel.
Operations Support: Degradation of assembly hardware could impact the operations support safety function of the shipping container, especially during loading and unloading.
Based on the impacts of the degradation mechanisms associated with assembly hardware on the transportation safety functions, corrosion and stress corrosion cracking was assigned a MEDIUM transportation importance. Creep, metal fatigue caused by temperature fluctuations, and hydriding effects were assigned a LOW transportation importance.
UFD Storage and Transportation -Transportation Working Group Report
August 31, 2011 11 
Fuel Baskets
Fuel baskets could degrade through 3 primary mechanisms during extended storage: 1) creep, 2) metal fatigue caused by temperature fluctuations, and 3) corrosion (see Table 4 ). These phenomena were Heat Transfer: Degradation of fuel baskets could impact heat transfer within the shipping container.
Structural Integrity: Baskets are components of the structure of a shipping cask system. Thus, degradation of the baskets could affect the structural integrity of the shipping container under HAC conditions.
Operations Support: Degradation of fuel baskets could impact the operations support safety function of the shipping container, especially during loading and unloading.
Based on the impacts of the degradation mechanisms associated with fuel baskets on the transportation safety functions, the degradation mechanisms associated with fuel baskets were assigned a LOW transportation importance. 
Neutron Poisons
Neutron poisons media could degrade through 6 primary mechanisms during extended storage: 1) thermal aging effects, 2) embrittlement and cracking, 3) stress-induced creep, 4) metal fatigue caused by temperature fluctuations, 5) poison burnup, and 6) corrosion (see Table 5 ). These phenomena were discussed in Section 5.5 of Hanson et al. (2011) . For dry storage, thermal aging effects, embrittlement and
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cracking, creep, and corrosion were assigned a medium priority for additional research and development.
Poison burnup and metal fatigue caused by temperature fluctuations were assigned a low priority.
Degradation of neutron poisons media could affect the six transportation safety functions as follows:
Criticality Control: Neutron poisons are the basis for the criticality control function. Therefore, degradation of the neutron poisons could affect the criticality control function.
Shielding: No impact.
Heat Transfer: Degradation of neutron poisons media could impact heat transfer within shipping containers.
Structural Integrity: Degradation of neutron poisons media would not impact the structural integrity of the shipping container, except to the extent that the poison bearing materials are used in, or as functional components of, basket structures, which are integral to the structural performance of the shipping container.
Operations Support: Degradation of neutron poisons media could impact the operations support safety function of the shipping container, especially during loading and unloading. Here the effect would be twofold, one being criticality control and the other would be neutron radiation, which would be multiplied by the subcritical multiplier effect.
Based on the impacts of the degradation mechanisms associated with neutron poisons media on the transportation safety functions, thermal aging effects were assigned a HIGH transportation importance.
Creep and corrosion were assigned a MEDIUM transportation importance. Embrittlement and cracking, metal fatigue caused by temperature fluctuations, and poison burnup were assigned a LOW transportation importance. 
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Neutron Shielding
Neutron shields could degrade through 4 primary mechanisms during extended storage: 1) embrittlement, cracking, shrinkage, and decomposition, 2) radiation embrittlement, 3) poison burnup, and 4) corrosion (see Table 6 ). These phenomena were discussed in Section 5.6 of Hanson et al. (2011) . For dry storage, these phenomena were assigned a low priority for additional research and development.
Degradation of neutron shields during extended storage could affect the six transportation safety functions as follows:
Criticality Control: No impact.
Shielding: The neutron shields in shipping containers are typically made from boron containing polymer-based materials. For transportation-only overpacks, these neutron shields would be maintained during the life of a shipping container, so any degradation would be remediated and have no impact. For transportable storage casks such as the TN-32, neutron shields are not designed to be maintained. Thus August 31, 2011 15 for the transportable storage casks, neutron shield degradation could impact the ability to transport UNF after extended storage.
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Heat Transfer: Heat transfer components pass through neutron shielding and could be affected by degradation of the neutron shielding material.
Structural Integrity: Degradation of neutron shielding could impact the structural integrity of the shipping container if the neutron shield contributes to impact protection or the structural performance of handling features or if it interacts with impact protection components of the shipping packaging as may be the case for transportable storage casks. For transport-only shipping containers neutron shields would be maintained during the life of a shipping container, so any degradation would be remediated.
Operations Support: No impact.
Based on the impacts of the degradation mechanisms associated with neutron shields on the transportation safety functions, the degradation mechanisms associated with neutron shields for transportation-only systems were assigned a LOW transportation importance. For transportable storage casks, embrittlement, cracking, shrinkage, and decomposition were assigned a MEDIUM transportation importance. Other degradation mechanisms were assigned a LOW transportation importance. 
Containers
There are two generic types of containers used to store UNF, bolted direct-load metal casks and welded metal canisters. About 13% of the storage containers currently in use are bolted direct-load metal casks and 87% are welded metal canisters. Welded metal canisters could degrade through 2 primary mechanisms during extended storage: 1) external atmospheric corrosion, and 2) internal aqueous corrosion. Bolted direct-load metal casks could degrade through 5 primary mechanisms during extended storage: 1) thermomechanical embrittlement of elastomer seals, 2) thermomechanical fatigue of seals and bolts, 3) radiation-enhanced embrittlement of elastomer seals, 4) external atmospheric corrosion, and 5) internal aqueous corrosion (see Table 7 ). These phenomena were discussed in Section 5.7 of Hanson et al.
(2011). For dry storage, atmospheric corrosion and aqueous corrosion were assigned a high priority for additional research and development. Thermomechanical fatigue of seals and bolts was assigned a medium priority and thermomechanical, chemical or radiation-induced embrittlement of elastomer seals was assigned a low priority.
Degradation of containers during extended storage could affect the six transportation safety functions as follows:
Containment: The degradation of the containers could impair the ability to provide containment of radioactive material. Further, any degradation of the container could impact the ability to maintain the inert cover gas which could lead to degradation of the fuel, the fuel basket, the cladding, and neutron poisons.
Criticality Control: Degradation of the container could lead to the loss of inert atmosphere and the potential acceleration of oxidation and corrosion of the clad/fuel, fuel assembly structure, basket structure, and neutron poison material. Any early corrosion could provide a mechanism for loss of confinement of fuel from its fuel assembly structure and change in the physical location of components and materials that are relied on to prevent criticality. In addition, any failure of the container could have the potential to fail the moderator exclusion control (if applicable) and introduce potential criticality issues.
Shielding: Any loss of container integrity is not expected to significantly impact the ability of the package to provide radiation shielding.
Heat Transfer: Any degradation of the container internals could impact system heat transfer.
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Structural Integrity: Depending on the specific shipping container, degradation of welded metal canisters could impact the structure of the shipping container. Degradation of bolted direct-load metal casks could impact the structural integrity of the cask, i.e., the shipping container.
Operations Support: Degradation of the containment function of the shipping container, if it led to degradation of the basket structure, fuel assembly structure, neutron poison media, cladding, or fuel could impact loading/unloading operations Based on the impacts of the degradation mechanisms associated with containers on the transportation safety functions, thermomechanical fatigue of seals and bolts was assigned a HIGH transportation importance. Atmospheric and aqueous corrosion was assigned a MEDIUM transportation importance.
Embrittlement of elastomer seals was assigned a LOW transportation importance. 
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Inert Fill Gas
The container provides the primary physical boundary for used fuel storage. The inert fill gas, typically helium, provides a non-chemically-reactive/non-oxidizing environment that is a key basis for determining that fuel classification does not change during extended storage. The inert fill gas also performs a heat transfer function thereby minimizing thermally-induced creep and accelerated corrosion of cladding and/or fuel which could affect the ability to perform ITS functions. Thus, monitoring for out-leakage of helium (or other inert gas) and in-leakage of oxygen is likely to be an important factor in the safe longterm storage of used fuel in dry storage systems and subsequent transportation. Because the inert fill gas is typically helium, it will not degrade when exposed to radiation and does not degrade through chemical means (a possible exception includes the effects of residual moisture and associated radiolytic decontamination products). A primary degradation mechanism would be diffusion of the inert fill gas UFD Storage and Transportation -Transportation Working Group Report August 31, 2011 19 through the canister wall (see Table 8 ). The inert fill gas could also be lost from a failed container (see Section 2.7) or, over very long periods of time, through minute leakage pathways that would not constitute failed containment. Last the inert gas fill could be modified over time by residual moisture and associated radiolytic decontamination products and by the gradual accumulation of gases leaking through pinholes and cracks in the cladding of undamaged UNF.
Loss of, atmospheric contamination, residual moisture modification, and/or fuel gas modifications of inert fill gas during extended storage could affect the six transportation safety functions as follows:
Containment: The degradation of inert fill gas (caused by failure of the containment boundary of containers or by modification resulting from residual moisture) could impair the ability to protect the physical integrity and functional performance of canister and UNF SSCs because of either corrosion, higher temperatures resulting from loss of heat transfer media, or both. Further, degradation of the containment boundary could further impact the ability to maintain the inert cover gas.
Criticality Control: Degradation of the containment boundary of the container could lead to the loss of inert atmosphere and the potential acceleration of oxidation and corrosion of the clad/fuel, fuel assembly structure, basket structure, and neutron poison material. Any early corrosion could provide a mechanism for loss of confinement of fuel from its fuel assembly structure and for change in the physical location of components and materials that are relied on to prevent criticality.
Shielding: Except for conditions where corrosion arising from in-leakage of atmospheric contaminants resulted in degradation of one or more SSCs contributing to significant displacement of fuel from its normal location, degradation or loss of inert gas fill is not expected to significantly impact the ability of the package radiation shielding to satisfy regulatory requirements for safe transportation.
Heat Transfer: Degradation of inert gas fill would impact the heat transfer characteristics of the shipping container system. Conditions wherein corrosion arising from in-leakage of atmospheric contaminants resulted in degradation of one or more SSCs contributing to significant displacement of fuel from its normal location, could also impact system heat transfer.
Structural Integrity: Except for conditions wherein corrosion arising from in-leakage of atmospheric contaminants or from residual moisture contaminants resulted in degradation of one or more SSCs
